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I. ABSTRACT 
This paper revisits a question asked and debated widely over the past decade: are Systems of Systems (SoS) just traditional 
systems or are they a new class of systems? Many have argued that SoS are a new class of systems, but little research has been 
available to provide evidence of this. In this paper we share highlights of recent research to show SoS not only have a different 
structure than systems and thus need to be engineered differently, but also may possess different attributes for beyond first use 
properties (the “illities”) such as flexibility and adaptability as compared to systems. By examining historical examples and by 
using a maritime security SoS as a research test bed, this paper shows that the “ility” called survivability had some design 
strategies that were directly mapped from systems and also allowed new strategies that only made sense for a SoS (e.g. vigilance). 
The paper also shows that some design strategies have a different implementation and meaning (e.g. margin) at the level of a 
system compared to SoS level. We conclude the answer to the question “Are SoS’s just systems?” is both yes and no. They are 
manifestly systems but possess properties not found in traditional systems. This is shown to true of the meta-property of 
survivability as applied against a directed SoS. 
II.  INTRODUCTION 
Systems Engineering has been developing since the development of the intercontinental ballistic missile and the Apollo 
program[1]. As System Engineering developed past the largely technical systems such as the ICBM and Apollo, it has to 
incorporate more sociotechnical issues. This was clearly documented by Hughes[1]. Some have argued that this development 
separates the discipline of traditional system engineering from a new discipline of engineering systems[2]. Another development 
that became clearer towards the end of the last century was that systems were being combined together into systems of systems. 
Of course, this seems like a tautology since the definition of a system[3] contains the idea of “a group of devices or artificial 
objects or an organization forming a network especially for distributing something or serving a common purpose”. This definition 
would suggest that a system of systems is itself a system. While this is obviously true, continued development of large scale 
systems of systems (such as the Air Traffic Management System; which is a system) as compared to a coffee pot (which is also a 
system) suggested that there substantial differences between the classes of systems. 
A. Differentiating a System of Systems from a Traditional System  
In a seminal paper, Maier[4] outlined some of the distinguishing characteristics of SoS. Maier suggested that SoS were composed 
of systems which were loosely coupled together and where the system elements has the properties of operational independence 
and managerial independence from a technical and social perspective. Another way to regard this is to note that in a System of 
Systems, the individual elements may locally produce value for some stakeholders and also globally produce value for an 
extended set of stakeholders. The individual elements may at times act independently and may even leave the system of systems. 
This is manifestly true of a set of aircraft in an Air Transportation System but makes no sense for a coffee pot (the heating element 
by itself does not produce value). Boardman et al.[5] extended the definitions along which Systems of Systems can be 
distinguished from systems. Karcanias et al.[6] followed up on Maier’s work and emphasized that the multi- agent nature of an 
SoS namely that agents in an SoS are at least partially autonomous, that each agent may only have a local view of the whole SoS 
or that the global view is too complex to be practical and that decision and information gathering may be distributed. 
 
The US Department of Defense[7] defines systems of systems as “a set or arrangement of systems that results when independent 
and useful systems are integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities”, although there have been many different 
definitions of SoSs in the literature[8][9]..  The independent and useful systems that make up a SoS are referred to as constituent 
systems.  Not all of the components in a SoS are constituent systems; most systems of systems will still require some traditional 
components that are not systems themselves, but are required for the overall SoS to function properly.   Some may argue that most 
“components” within a system, even within a traditional system like a stereo, are actually systems themselves. For example, a CD 
player can be considered a system because it is made up of components such as a motor, laser, and digital-to-audio-converter 
(DAC).   Components of a traditional system that are composed themselves of subcomponents that interact with each other, are 
referred to as subsystems.  Yet, what distinguishes a system of subsystems, from a system of systems? There are a number of key 
system of systems properties that have been identified in the literature[4] which distinguish systems of systems from traditional 
systems.  They include: 
 
Operational Independence of the Elements.  A system of systems is composed of constituent systems, which can independent 
and useful in their own right.  They can exist and provide some value to stakeholders outside the SoS.  In traditional systems, 
components are not likely to be valuable by themselves or be able to operate outside of the system. 
 
Managerial Independence of the Elements.  The constituent systems have the ability to decide their own actions and behavior. 
 
Evolutionary Development.  A system of systems goes through evolutionary development where components and constituent 
systems are added, removed, and modified in response to changes in context. 
 
Emergent Behavior.  The US DoD[7]  defines emergent behavior as “behavior which is unexpected or cannot be predicted from 
knowledge of the system’s constituent parts”, even though it acknowledges that there is no single, universally accepted definition 
of emergence.  Regardless, the reason why system architects construct a system of systems in the first place, is so that the SoS can 
perform higher-level functions that are not possible by any single constituent system.  
 
Geographic Distribution. The span of the geographic distance between the component systems is so large, that they are usually 
only exchanging information and not useful quantities of mass and energy. 
 
Connections.  Constituent systems tend not to be totally independent or totally dependent when interacting within a SoS.  Rather, 
they are inter-dependent and loosely coupled.  In traditional systems, there tends to be tight coupling and strong inter-operations 
between components. 
 
Multi-Functionality.  The constituent systems within a system of systems tend to be able to perform multiple functions and roles 
within the SoS.  Components within a traditional system tend to be uni-functional. 
 
Contextual Diversity.  Due to the increased geographical separation, constituent systems tend to have more contextual diversity 
in a SoS than components in a traditional system.   
 
Unbounded.  Systems of systems are often unbounded, meaning that components can be added, modified and removed 
independently of some central administrative control.  Furthermore, the decision to add, remove or modify components is often 
done by stakeholders with a limited understanding of the entire SoS.  Traditional systems tend to be bounded, where decisions 
about the addition, modification and removal of components are done by a central authority with complete knowledge of the 
system. 
 
Many authors acknowledge the following types of SoSs.  
 
Directed SoS. A directed SoS exists to meet a purpose given by a central authority. The component agents have their actions 
dictated by the central authority so as to accomplish a central purpose. An example is a joint military force composed of ships and 
planes under a single unified command. 
 
Collaborative SoS. A collaborative SoS has no central authority with coercive power over the constituents. The actions of the 
individual agents are governed both by their own needs as well as the needs of the SoS. SoS objectives are met by collective 
agreement of the agents to pursue an agenda. An example is the Internet. 
 
Virtual SoS. A Virtual SoS lacks any central authority. The behavior arises from the unplanned, un-coordinated interactions of 
the agents. An example is intermodal transport of freight via a train or truck network. 
 
Acknowledged SoS[10]. An Acknowledged SoS has a central authority but it does not have coercive power over the agents. The 
different agents retain their own budgets, decision-making and objectives. An example would be the Army Future Combat 
System[11] or the DoD/NOASS National Polar Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)[12]. 
 
In this paper, we explore the idea that SoSs not only have a different structure than systems and thus need to be engineered 
differently[13] but also may possess different attributes for beyond first use properties such as flexibility and adaptability[14] as 
compared to systems. In Section III we explore some key differences between systems and systems of systems. In Section IV we 
look at “beyond first use properties” for systems and then for SoSs.  In Section V, though a simulation of a maritime security SoS 
and case studies, we show that for survivability, the strategies used for SoSs and traditional systems can be different, and these 
differences are important. We speculate that this may be true of many of the illities. Thus the answer to the question “Are SoS’s just 
systems?” is both yes and no. They are manifestly systems but possess properties not found in traditional systems.  
III. SOME KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SYSTEMS AND SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS 
A. Lifecycle Change 
Systems of systems often experience both exogenous and endogenous change.  Often, decision makers implement endogenous 
changes to mitigate the harmful effects of a contextual change, or take advantage of new opportunities.   SoS go through various 
changes, some of which can be made immediately, some of which can be made only after an analysis is performed, while others 
require a significant re-architecting effort that results in an “evolution” in the system architecture.  
 
The likelihood for change is higher for SoS that have long lifetimes, operate in dynamic contexts, or have complex behavior.  
Endogenous change, in either the number and type of components, or their attributes and capabilities, is particularly an issue with 
systems of systems, since they go through evolutionary development as components are added, removed and changed over time[4].  
Even if the components themselves do not change, what they do within the overall system might change.  For example, certain F-
16s, acting as components of a larger military SoS, may change from air-to-air combat roles to air-to-surface attack roles.   
B. Value Delivery to Stakeholders 
Engineered systems are designed to provide value, which is the net benefit or utility (i.e. received benefits less costs for receiving 
those benefits) (Richards, Ross, Hastings, & Rhodes, 2008) an engineered system provides to its stakeholders. In traditional 
systems, the boundaries, as well as stakeholders, are often well-defined.  Indeed when students are taught system engineering, one 
of the first things they are taught is to define the system boundary[15].  By contrast, the agents in a SoS may belong to multiple 
SoSs and thus the concept of the SoS boundary, as well as overall value delivery is less clear.  To illustrate this concept, consider 
a maritime security SoS (this will be discussed in more detail later) that includes an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), a Ground 
Control Station (GCS), and a satellite that links the two ().  The UAV and GCS are owned and operated by one set of stakeholders 
(𝛤!), who lease the services of the satellite from a satellite communications provider (𝛤!).  The satellite is part of the SoS that 
includes the UAV and the GCS (SoS M), but the satellite stakeholders also lease bandwidth to cell phone companies (𝛤!).  Thus, 
the satellite is also part of cellular phone SoS as well (SoS C).   
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Example of a System Belonging to Multiple Systems of Systems 
Let 𝑉!|!! be the value that the satellite delivers to its stakeholders, the satellite communications provider (𝛤!).   This value is 
different, but related to the value that the satellite provides to the cell phone operators (𝑉!|!!) and the value that the satellite 
provides to the maritime security stakeholders (𝑉!|!!).  The viability of the satellite to its stakeholders is determined by whether 
or not 𝑉!|!! exceeds some minimum threshold set by its stakeholders (𝑇!|!!).   𝑉!|!! will be some combination of the value the 
satellite brings to its stakeholders by participating in both the maritime security SoS (𝑉!|!!) and the cellular SoS (𝑉!|!!).  Suppose 
the government requires more bandwidth for the maritime security SoS and give an appropriate increase in compensation.  This 
means less bandwidth for the cell phone companies, reducing the value of the satellite in their SoS  (𝑉!|!!), even though the value 
of the satellite increases for the satellite and maritime security stakeholders.   
C. Influences 
Another difference between SoS and traditional systems is the nature of the influence between the component agents. Systems can 
exchange mass, energy, momentum and information between their component parts[2]. However since some kinds of SoS allow 
operational and managerial independence of the component agents, there is also the possibility of social or economic influences 
between the constituents.  
 
A variety of frameworks have been proposed to describe the structure, operation and management of an SoS[16].Of particular 
importance is that each constituent is trying to satisfy a locally specified value proposition, i.e., they are free to make decision that 
ensure their local needs are met. The extent to which these decision support a broader SoS agenda depends upon the alignment of 
these local needs with the SoS goals mediated by whatever influences that the SoS authority brings to bear upon the constituents. 
As described by Bjelkemyr: 
“Each system within a SoS is a self-interested node in a network. These system nodes try to maximize their own utility under the 
influences of and in competition with the other nodes. The global SoS behavior thus emerges as a result of the actions at the lower 
levels of the SoS, down to the system element level.” [16]. 
 
One can observe this challenge in real world SoSs. For example, peering disputes among the Internet service providers is an issue 
of choosing with which other systems one wishes to connect, i.e., with whom to collaborate. As an example, in October of 2005, 
Level 3 communications a Boston based Tier 1 Internet service provider decided to terminate its peering agreement with Cogent 
communications, another Tier 1 provider. By refusing to peer with Cogent, Level 3 cut-off direct traffic flow between their 
respective networks. This forced routing via third-party network increasing congestion on those links. For some customers whose 
only connection was via Level 3, they were disconnected from those hosts whose only connection was via a Cogent network. The 
same was true in the other direction. After a few days, cooler heads prevailed and the peered connection was reestablished[17]. 
The underlying cause of the dispute was an imbalance in traffic flow between the two networks. Level 3 felt that Cogent was in 
violation of their contract when Cogent tried to make inroads into Level 3’s market of selling access to Tier 2 providers. If a given 
Tier 2 provider, directly connected to Cogent instead of going through Level 3, this might create a traffic imbalance to Cogent’s 
benefit. 
 
The essential difference between the decision structure in traditional system engineering versus SoS engineering is one of 
alignment. The SoS architect may need to influence the constituent decision makers to behave in a manner that is not necessarily 
locally optimal for them but does serve the interest of the SoS. This relationship between the SoS architect and the constituent 
decision makers is a principal-agent problem[18]. In the SoS case, the principal is the central authority/SoS architect who wishes 
to effect some SoS behavior that they value via the actions of the agents, i.e., constituents. Given this framing, the central 
authority is referred to as a SoS principal. Note that constituents may be interacting with multiple such authorities at a given time 
(e.g. if they are participating in multiple SoS) and may also act as such an authority themselves with respect to other constituents 
such as in a collaborative SoS. 
D. Systems Affecting Other Systems within a SoS 
One of the largest problems in a SoS is that the environment in which a constituent system interacts often forms part of the 
context of one or more other constituent systems.   That is, the outputs of a constituent system, whether voluntary or involuntary, 
often become the inputs of another system within the SoS. This is illustrated in Figure 3, and was the case with the North 
American power grid, which suffered a large failure in 2003 as a result of systems negatively impacting other systems within a 
SoS.     
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Contextual diversity for a System of Systems 
1) SoS Case Study:  North American Power Grid 
 
Many experts believe that the North American power grid is one of the largest and most complex systems of the technological 
age, with approximately 15,000 nodes (power stations), and 20,000 transmission lines  (edges) [23]  ().  The primary purpose of 
the power grid is to ensure that power is safely and effectively transferred from generators to end users, in a complex network of 
interconnected nodes that span a large geographical area and include many different independent power operators.   The North 
American power grid is divided in the Eastern, Western and Texas regions, which are tightly coupled within each region, and 
loosely coupled between.     
 
On August 14, 2003 at approximately 4:10pm EDT, the second largest blackout ever affected large parts of the Northeastern 
United States and parts of Canada. By the end of the day, more than 508 generating units at 264 power plants shut down, after a 
3.5 GW power surge affected the transmission grid.  The blackout lasted between 7 and 16 hours, and resulted in a 20% increase 
in fatalities during that period.   Although many critical systems had backup generators, some critical systems failed because their 
generators failed or they ran out of fuel, including certain telephone services, water supplies, gas stations, border crossings, 
hospitals and television/radio stations 
  
 
Figure 3:  The Power Grid Lights Up North America as Viewed From Space 
Disconnections affect the nodes that are no longer connected to the network in obvious ways.   However, in networks such as the 
North American power grid, disconnections also impact nearby nodes that are still connected to the network.  Since large amounts 
of electrical power are not easily stored, the power grid must carefully balance the demand of electricity to its supply.   In power 
grids, failure of an edge transfers the load being carried by the edge to other edges in the network.  If those other edges have the 
additional capacity to carry the load (i.e. margin), then there is not a problem.   However, there are limits to how much load an 
edge can carry and if those limits are approached, then the new edge may fail itself either involuntarily, or by being shut down to 
prevent damage.  When this new edge subsequently fails, then other edges must take both its load as well as the load of the 
original failing edge as well.  This can cause a chain reaction, where failures lead to further failures that propagate throughout the 
system.  Cascading failures are a special type of chain reaction where the small failures eventually lead to major events, e.g. a 
nuclear power operator spilling coffee on a command console causing a chain reaction that ends in a Chernobyl-level accident.  
Preventing chain reactions and in particular, cascading failures, should be a priority for system architects.  illustrates how chain 
reaction of small events can grew into the cascading failure that resulted in the US Northeast Blackout of 2003.  The initial 
incident was an untrimmed tree in Ohio that severed a power line.  This link failure burdened other lines with an extra load, 
causing some of them to fail as well.  Each failing power line placed additional load on the remaining lines until they succumbed 
as well, leading to a chain reaction of power line failures.  Eventually, enough power line failures caused entire power plant 
generators to shut down as a precaution, in a cascading failure that eventually lead to a complete grid failure covering the 
Northeastern United States and some parts of Canada.  There were multiple incidents and circumstances along the way that 
contributed to this unfortunate outcome.  One such perturbation was the failure to recognize and mitigate the failing power lines in 
Ohio, due to a software bug affecting the control rooms of one of the Ohio power plants[24]. Cascading failures are system 
failures that result from component failures that cause other components to fail, which cause further components to fail, and so 
forth.  Cascading failures are a major concern for connected networks like a power grid, but also occur in other systems as well.  
 
 
Figure 4:  Chain Reaction Leading to the Northeast Blackout of 2003 
IV. BEYOND FIRST USE PROPERTIES 
As engineering systems have developed, attention has turned to what have been called “beyond first use properties”[2]. Since 
many of these systems last a long time and through possible changes in context, it is important to understand properties such as 
flexibility, adaptability, survivability, evolvability of the system design as much as (first) performance, cost and schedule[14]. 
These have been called the “ilities” and appropriate attention to them can make for fundamental changes in the initial design of the 
system[20]. Recent work has looked at extensively at one at the “ilities” namely survivability[21] and shown how the ideas and 
metrics  behind this “ility” can be embedded in the initial tradespace analysis for a system even across multiple eras and epochs. 
Previous work has shown how the same kind of analysis can be done on embedding flexibility in the design of a system. In this 
paper we shall argue that for Systems of Systems, the “ilities” may take on additional meanings that have no analog for systems.  
Flexibility and the other ‘ilities” have been defined rigorously for systems[22].  Table 1 has a set of definitions: 
Table 1: "-Ilities" Relating to Change 
As systems, SoS may have similar “ility” properties. However, there may be additional ones that arise out of some of the 
distinguishing characteristics of systems of systems highlighted in Section II.  
 
“Ility” Description 
Adaptability  Ability to be changed by a system-internal change agent with intent  
Agility  Ability to change in a timely fashion  
Changeability  Ability to alter its operations or form, and consequently possibly its function, at an acceptable level 
of resources  
Evolvability  Ability to be inherited and changed across generations (over time)  
Extensibility  Ability to accommodate new features after design  
Flexibility  Ability to be changed by a system-external change agent with intent  
Interoperability  Ability to effectively interact with other systems  
Modifiability  Ability to change the current set of specified system parameters   
Modularity  The degree to which a system is composed of modules (not an ability-type ility)  
Reconfigurability   Ability to change its component arrangement and links reversibly  
Robustness  Ability to maintain its level and/or set of specified parameters in the context of changing system 
external and internal forces  
Scalability  Ability to change the current level of a specified system parameter   
Survivability  Ability to minimize the impact of a finite duration disturbance on value delivery  
Value Robustness  Ability to maintain value delivery in spite of changes in needs or context  
Versatility  Ability to satisfy diverse needs for the system without having to change form (measure of latent 
value)  
 
A. Survivability Strategies for a System 
We will illustrate the possibility of additional dimensions to the “ility” properties by contrasting the options available for a 
system to be survivable and for a SoS to be survivable. Richards defined survivability for a system as the ability of a system to 
minimize the impact of finite-duration disturbances on value delivery through (I) the reduction of the likelihood or magnitude of a 
disturbance, (II) the satisfaction of a minimally acceptable level of value delivery during and after a disturbance, and/or (III) a 
timely recovery. Following Ross[14], he defined an epoch as a time period with a fixed context; characterized by static constraints, 
design concepts, available technologies, and articulated attributes. Then the value delivery for a survivable system can be plotted as 
 
Figure 5:  The Three Types of Survivability (Richards, 2009) 
On the basis of a review of the empirical principles used in four systems that are known to be survivable (Blackhawk helicopter, 
A-10 “Warthog” attack aircraft, F-16C Falcon and the Iridium global cellular satellite constellation), he was able to derive 
seventeen survivability design principles. These are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2:  Survivaiblity Strategies for Systems (Richards, 2009) 
When these design principles are placed on the value delivery for a survivable system, the following diagram results (Figure 6) 
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Figure 6:  Applying Survivability Strategies Before, During and After Involuntary Epoch Changes 
This shows the set of strategies that a survivable system may use. As long as these strategies have meaning they can be applied to 
SoSs. For example, the strategy of margin can be applied to a system (have more capability than necessary) as well as to a SoS 
(both at the level of the component systems and at the level of the whole architecture). This will be shown below in the maritime 
security SoS simulation. 
V. SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS STRATEGIES 
 
For a SoS, the question is if there are additional strategies that enable survivability that would have no meaning for a system or 
possibly a different meaning than for a system?  To answer that question, in this paper we examine one of the largest SoS failures 
ever, the Northeast Blackout of 2003 as well as develop and exercise a discrete event simulation of a SoS. 
A. A Maritime Security System of Systems 
In order to explore the question of SoS survivability, a discrete event simulation was developed of a maritime security SoS.  
Maritime security SoS (MarSoS) are relatively easy to model and possess many of the distinguishing characteristics of systems of 
systems. In the language defined previous, a MarSoS is a directed SoS. 
 
1) Objectives 
Not all maritime security SoSs are the same, but they typically share the goal of ensuring that ships entering a particular body of 
water are complying with appropriate rules and regulations.  At a minimum, a MarSoS is responsible for maintaining a certain 
degree of situational awareness over a particular body of water, known as the Area of Interest (AOI).  Usually, the MarSoS is 
required to know the location, identity and heading information of any ship within the Area of Interest (AOI).  In many cases, the 
MarSoS is responsible for enforcing the laws and regulations governing the AOI as well, and this typically means tracking and 
intercepting any possible ships that may be violating those rules.   
 
2) Components 
The primary effectors of the MarSoS are manned and unmanned vehicles.  All of the unmanned vehicles are aerial (i.e. UAVs) 
while the manned vehicles include both aerial and naval.  These vehicles are not merely components of a larger system, but 
systems in their own right.  In addition to the vehicles, there are supporting systems, such as command center, radar towers and 
ground control stations.  The selection of components that constitute the MarSoS is variable, and one of the ways in which 
strategies can be tested and induced, but design options for the MarSoS in the quantitative model included the following: 
 
Operational UAVs (OUAV).   UAVs used for operational functions, such as detection of targets.   
 
Tactical UAVs (TUAV).   UAVs used for identification and observation of targets. 
 
Manned Patrol Boats (MPB).  Manned patrol boats used for detection, identification, observation and interception of targets. 
 
Manned Helicopters (MHel).  Manned helicopters used for identification and observation of targets. 
 
Manned Patrol Aircraft (MPA).  Manned patrol aircraft used for identification and observation of targets. 
 
Command Center.  Center used for coordination of tasks between the vehicles of the MarSoS. 
 
Airbases.  The location where manned patrol aircraft reside when not in use as well as the location for the ground control stations 
controlling the UAVs.  The distance between the UAVs and the ground control station impacts the quality of the communications.  
 
Docks.  The location where manned patrol boats reside when not in use. 
 
3) System of Systems Characteristics of a MarSoS 
A MarSoS exhibits some of the key properties that distinguish systems of systems from traditional systems[25], including the 
following: 
 
Component Independence.  The vehicles themselves are capable of operating independently and providing value to their own 
stakeholders outside of the SoS.  For example, a UAV that is part of the SoS, can be used outside of the SoS, for wildlife tracking 
or to fight forest fires, for example.    
 
Distributed Authority.   Managerial independence requires that the constituent systems have the ability to make decisions on 
their own, or through collaboration with other constituent systems.  A MarSoS can be configured such that decision making, such 
as task assignment, is done via a central authority, or done collaboratively by the vehicles themselves.  
 
Geographical Separation.  Maritime security systems of systems are typically made up of several vehicles, along with 
supporting components (e.g. radar towers, ground control stations, etc.).  Unlike traditional, monolithic systems, most of the 
components within a MarSoS are not co-located, but rather are distributed around a relatively large AOI.   
 
Multi-Functionality. A simple, traditional system is more likely to have a single function or purpose, whereas a system of system 
is more likely to be multi-functional. In a MarSoS, there are several tasks that need to be performed, i.e. detect, identify, and if 
necessary, intercept targets.   
 
Increased Contextual Diversity.  Since components in systems of systems are more likely to be physically separated than those 
in traditional systems, it follows that they will be more likely to be operating under different environmental conditions.  While a 
UAV in one part of the AOI may be experiencing a relatively high load of including ships, other UAVs in other parts of the AOI 
may be idle.  Certain vehicles in the MarSoS, for example, may be operating on water, others on land, while others are in the air.   
 
Decreased System Awareness.  Since components in the MarSoS are often operating under different contexts, they must share 
the contextual information with each other in a timely manner, for all of the components to have the same system awareness at 
any given time. In order for that to happen, three things must occur; (1) the important differences in context must be apparent, (2) 
stakeholders must be willing to share this information (not always the case, particularly if the contextual differences are the 
stakeholder preferences and policies), and (3) mechanisms must exist for this information to be shared in a timely manner. For 
these reasons, components within systems of systems that operate under different contexts may be operating under incorrect or 
incomplete information about the system itself, than components within traditional systems operating under the same context.   
 
Evolutionary Development.  Traditional systems are typically assembled during implementation, before the system is operated.  
Since components of systems of systems are often added or removed during the operation of the SoS, what the SoS is composed 
of may be continually evolving.  Such is the case with a MarSoS, which may change its configuration at any time based on 
evolving stakeholder needs and contextual considerations.  An example of a change might be to replace larger UAVs coordinated 
by a central authority with swarms of smaller UAVs that coordinate their tasks collectively. 
 
Abstruse Emergence.  In traditional systems, emergent behavior is often part of the design (or at least expected), and as such, is 
usually a benefit overall. In systems of systems, particularly those with evolutionary development, emergent behaviors are more 
difficult to predict and often end up being problematic.  Such is the case with a MarSoS, particularly when disruptions occur and 
there is a disconnect in the information sharing between the various components.  This may lead to one component acting and re-
acting based on a different set of information than another, leading to emergent behavior that is difficult to predict. 
 
4) Dynamic Context 
For this quantitative model, the area of interest is a littoral environment, consisting of narrow water passageway located between 
two landmasses.  Typically, all ships above a certain size are required to have international transponders that pass the relevant 
identity, cargo and destination information to local port authorities, although additional confirmation by the MarSoS is sometimes 
required.  The MarSoS normally has to identify smaller ships that typically do not have transponders.  Methods of identification 
include marine radar, visual inspection and/or direct communication.   Although there are many different types of ships that pass 
through this AOI, they can be divided into three broad categories; (1) compliant ships, (2) smugglers, (3) terrorists.  Compliant 
ships are a general category for ships that are complying with the appropriate laws and regulations, and are not hostile towards the 
MarSoS.  Compliant ships include civilian sailboats, cargo ships, cruise ships, fishing vessels, police boats and friendly military 
vessels.   Smugglers are non-compliant ships carrying contraband.  A vessel of any size may contain contraband, but larger 
vessels have more capacity for smuggling.  However, cargo size is not an indicator of cargo importance, as smugglers may hide 
some of the most dangerous contraband, such as weapons-grade uranium, aboard smaller vessels.  Terrorists are non-compliant 
ships that wish to detonate high-impact explosives at the port.  For the quantitative model, terrorists have a Modus Operandi (MO) 
based on a previous study on a low-probability, high-impact terrorist attack on a maritime port conducted by the Naval 
Postgraduate School[26] in which terrorists appear to be compliant civilian vessels until they are close to the port, at which point 
they head at full speed and detonate a bomb.   
 
5) Model description 
 
Researchers to give insight into various designs and contexts when it is impossible or impractical to use real systems and 
environments use models.   Although the real systems and environments may be very complex, all models make some 
assumptions that may simplify the underlying relationships enough so that they may tractable.  If simple, parametric models can 
be made that describe the real phenomenon with enough fidelity that they are useful to decision makers, then it is often possible to 
use numerical methods and computing solutions to explore a full tradespace of millions of designs and contexts.  However, if it is 
necessary to capture emergent behavior that is not easily simplified, as in the case with many systems of systems particularly 
those that involve socio-technical aspects, then simulation is often necessary.   
a) Simulation of Complex Systems 
In choosing the type of simulation to be used, several considerations were made.  First, since time is a critical property of a 
MarSoS, dynamic simulations are required.  This means static simulations, such as traditional Monte Carlo methods, are 
inappropriate.  The next consideration to make is whether to use discrete or continuous models.  Continuous models are more 
appropriate for modeling continuous phenomenon, such as electricity flow through a power grid or climate change caused by CO2 
emissions.  However, endogenous and exogenous changes in the MarSoS are typically discrete. A ship randomly arriving in the 
AOI, a UAV being shot down, or a smuggler being identified as hostile entity are all examples of discrete-events that occur during 
the operation of a MarSoS.   It is at these discrete-events that the state of the system and/or context changes, the effects of which 
must be determined through simulation.  The last consideration to be made is whether or not the simulation is deterministic or 
stochastic.  As with many complex systems of systems, there is a large amount of uncertainty both in context and within the 
system.  Inputs to the system are often random in both time and space.  The arrival of boats in the AOI, for example, can be 
modeled as a Poisson process with a mean time between boat arrivals of 1/λ, and a random location uniformly distributed along 
the border of the AOI.  Endogenous events can be stochastic as well; such as the exact time it takes a human operator to identify a 
ship once he has a visual from a particular UAV.   Since there is uncertainty in both exogenous and endogenous events, a 
stochastic simulation, particularly one that models the extreme conditions, is necessary particularly if survivability and robustness 
of the MarSoS is a concern.   
 
Discrete-event simulation is a popular technique that has been used to model large-scale systems of systems like maritime security 
systems of systems.  Discrete-event simulations are particularly well suited to models that have stochastic, dynamic and discrete-
event properties, because they simulate discrete-events in a step-by-step manner, updating the state of the system and its context at 
specified time intervals, and allow random variables as inputs.    
 
 
 
Figure 7 Information Flow through the DES 
b) Agent Based Modeling 
Systems of systems have many properties that make assessing value delivery non-trivial.  Unlike many simple systems, equations 
alone do not adequately describe the relationship between components. Constituent systems have managerial and operational 
independence, which makes modeling of individual behavior and decision making necessary.  Action and reaction to 
environmental changes is not simply a matter of physics.  Instead, constituent systems perform actions based on the information 
they have at the time and their own priorities.  If humans are operating some of the constituent systems, then there is typically 
going to be a stochastic behavioral element to be considered as well.  When the individual behaviors of the constituent systems 
interact with each other, the behavior of the overall SoS may not function as expected.   
 
To assess the performance of a MarSoS, an agent-based DES was implemented where individual constituent systems make 
tactical decisions based on their own behavior characteristics and the local information they have at some particular time.  This 
way, the individual actions and reactions can be ascertained and overall behavior of the SoS can be assessed.   
 
c) Limitations of Agent-Based DES 
As with any modeling or simulation technique, agent-based, discrete-event simulations do have limitations and drawbacks. 
Almost all mathematical models require simplifying assumptions, which may affect the validity of the results, and agent-based 
discrete-event simulations are no exception.  Also, as with any model, the quality of the outputs is strongly correlated with the 
quality of the inputs, e.g. if there is an error in the assumption used to determine an input such as the arrival rate of ships into the 
AOI, then there may be a significant error in one or more outputs, such as the probability of detection.   
 
Due to the stochastic nature of the inputs and models, the outputs of the agent-based DES are typically stochastic themselves.  
This means that for a given set of inputs, the simulation must be run multiple times (e.g. “trials”) to gather enough samples to 
estimate the true attributes of the system.  Depending on the level of statistical confidence required, the number of trials required 
could significantly increase the computational load.  This is a major concern, since perhaps the largest drawback to agent-based, 
discrete-event simulations is the considerable computational effort required to calculate the performance of even one design under 
once context.  Determining the potential actions and reactions of every entity, for each small increment of time, is often 
cumbersome even for modern computers.  If the behavior of each entity depends on the behavior of all the other entities in the 
system, then in many cases the behavior f(n) for the entities in the system is  O(n!) meaning that the computation effort required 
grows in a factorial relationship with the size of the SoS and context.  This can become a very serious problem if a large 
tradespace consisting of thousands of designs and potential contexts is to be explored, and multiple runs have to be made for each 
design/context pair for statistical confidence. 
B. Applying the Strategy of Margin to the MarSoS 
Certain system viability strategies can be applied to systems of systems either at the system-level (i.e. bottom-up) or at the SoS-
level (i.e. top-down).  To illustrate the difference, consider a MarSoS where UAVs are performing identification on targets that 
enter the AOI.   The identification process can be approximated as a queue, where the targets that need to be identified arrive 
according to a random process specified by a mean arrival rate λ.  There are k UAVs in the SoS, and each UAV identifies a target 
according to a random process with a mean service time of µ.   As long as k / µ ≫ λ, then all the targets should get identified 
before they cross the AOI.  Roughly speaking, k / µ represents the capacity of the system to identify targets, and λ represent the 
demand.   Suppose there is a perturbation where a sudden, large influx of targets arrives in the AOI according to some new arrival 
rate 𝜆!.  For this disturbance, k / µ <  𝜆!  meaning that all the UAVs will likely be busy for duration of the disturbance and some 
targets will leave the AOI unidentified as a result.   To make the SoS viable in this context, the principle of margin can be applied 
to either the UAVs or the SoS itself.  For example, if the payloads on the UAVs were improved such that the number of targets 
identified per unit time (i.e. µ) increased to meet the required capacity, then the SoS would be viable in case that perturbation 
arose.   This is an example of applying the principle of margin at the system-level, by increasing the technology level from low to 
high, and reaping the benefits at the SoS level. To apply the principle of margin at the SoS level, a system architect could simply 
increase the number of UAVs in the AOI (i.e. increase k) until there was enough capacity to satisfy the demand created by the 
perturbation.     
 
The MarSoS DES can be used to demonstrate and assess how the strategy of margin can be applied at both the system and SoS-
level.  Suppose that the stakeholders agree that in order for a MarSoS SoS to be viable, it must able to identify at least 90% of the 
ships that enter the AOI, on average.  A system is proposed, that has 14 vehicle assets (i.e. eight UAVs and four manned patrol 
boats) and the MarSoS DES simulation is run under normal contextual conditions.    Since the context and system behavior is 
highly stochastic, the output of any particular trial is a random variable and therefore multiple trials must be run to estimate the 
true mean of the probability of ID.  Since the simulation runs fairly quickly, a total of 10,000 runs are executed and the results are 
shown in . 
 
The mean of the probability of identification (ID) was estimated to be 0.941 with a very narrow confidence interval, due to the 
large sample size.  This system is viable, however it is important to note that there are certain times when the system may not be 
able to meet its viability criteria, due to some of the random effects of both the context and the system itself.  
 
Now suppose that the traffic in the AOI is doubled, perhaps due to a temporary disturbance such as an evacuation of a nearby 
country due to an earthquake, or a conflict that causes major shipping lanes to be re-routed through the AOI.   To see if the SoS 
remains viable, the MarSoS DES was run 10,000 times with the same SoS design but twice the ship traffic.  As shown in , the 
mean probability of ID for the SoS under high traffic conditions was found to be 0.867, which is below stakeholder thresholds.  
Again, due to the stochastic nature of the inputs and system response, there are certain cases where the SoS meets or exceeds the 
threshold as shown by the right-tail of the distribution, but on average, the system does not met the requirements and would 
therefore not be considered viable. 
 
To be able to handle disturbances where the traffic through the AOI is doubled, the SoS can implement the principle of margin at 
either the system or SoS-level to increase the throughput of the system. At the system level, the designers can use better 
technology (e.g. more advanced payloads) that reduce the amount of time it takes to identify a target by ½.  At the SoS-level, 
designers can simply double the number of vehicles in the SoS.  To assess the impact of both of these changes, the MarSoS SoS 
was run again 10,000 times for each strategy under the heavy traffic conditions.   The system-level implementation of the margin 
strategy (i.e. increasing the technology level of the payloads) exceeded the performance threshold under heavy conditions 
(probability of ID = 0.960, see ) and even surpassed the performance of the original system under regular traffic conditions.  
However, the probability of ID for the SoS that had double the number of vehicles (i.e. the SoS-level implementation of the 
margin strategy) only reached 0.885 (see ) and failed to meet the viability threshold, although it did improve performance over the 
baseline SoS.      
 
 
 
Figure 8:  Probability of Identification with Baseline SoS and regular traffic 
 
Figure 9:  Probability of identification with baseline SoS experiencing high traffic 
 
 Figure 10 Probability of Identification with System Level Margin and High Traffic 
 
Figure 11 Probability of Identification with SoS-level margin and high traffic 
The reason for the discrepancy between the system and SoS-level implementation of the margin strategy was due to the fact that 
there was a single command center that delegated tasks to the vehicles, and that command center operated similar to a single 
server queue.  As more vehicles were added, the command center did not have the resources to be able to effectively communicate 
with the additional vehicles and communication queues formed.  These queues caused the vehicles to wait longer for instructions 
and as a result, reduced their ability to perform their tasks in a timely manner.  Thus, the additional capacity that should have been 
realized by having additional vehicles was negated by the additional communication overhead that did not scale accordingly.    
This example highlights the difficulties of making change in one area, without really understanding how the changes will impact 
the overall operation of the rest of the system (or SoS).    
C. Other SoS Survivability Strategies 
1) Redundancy 
Margin is not the only survivability strategy that can be implemented at the system or SoS-level and it is not the only strategy that 
can have varying effectiveness a result.  For example, the strategy of redundancy can be applied at the SoS level by having 
multiple UAVs that perform the same task.  This strategy would reduce susceptibility to perturbations that reduce capacity of the 
system by eliminating capability, such as when components fail, or are incapacitated by hostile actions.  Redundancy can be 
applied to the system level, for example, by having multiple payloads onboard the same UAV.  By performing a cause-effect 
mapping, described below, system architects can see that having redundant UAVs reduces susceptibility to more perturbations 
than just redundant payloads.  For example, while both solutions will be viable in the event that a single payload fails, only the 
redundant UAV solution will be viable in numerous events such as engine failure, an operator not showing up for work, UAV 
being shot down, etc.  Furthermore, redundant UAVs also provide margin, whereas in most cases having multiple cameras of the 
same type onboard the same UAV will not improve capacity.   The main disadvantage to applying redundancy at the SoS level in 
this particular case would be cost.   
 
While redundancy may be more effective at the SoS level, the strategy of mobility, for example, may be more applicable at the 
system level.  Mobility provides viability in the presence of location-based disturbances.  A classic example is that in systems of 
systems that tend to have geographic distribution of their components, there is often not one SoS location.  Rather, the SoS is 
made up of components that each may have their own location, which may be affected by local disturbances. As location-based 
perturbations are local and do not apply to the entire SoS, similarly the solution of mobility is local and applicable only to the 
specific constituent systems that may be affected. 
 
2) Intensity Regulation 
In order for a SoS to be survivable, strategies must be implemented where the constituent systems ensure that their actions do not 
negatively impact the contexts of other constituent systems, if those changes may not be survivable.  In other words, they must not 
disrupt the context of other systems, if those systems are fragile to those disruptions. 
In the case of an intensity-based disturbance like that involving current, the intensity regulation of the system’s output is an 
example of a strategy that can help enable the survivability of systems. Throttling is when a system intentionally reduces its 
output, to increase its own survivability to a perturbation it is experiencing, or help other constituent systems avoid future 
perturbations by not disrupting their context.  In the case of power grids, throttling is achieved in part through “shedding load”, 
i.e. eliminating power to some areas (“rolling blackouts”) and/or reducing the voltage provided (“brownouts”).   
 
There are other examples of intensity throttling used in both traditional systems and systems of systems as well.  In most modern 
laptop computers, the CPU and GPU produce the lion share of the heat.  Heat is an unintentional interaction effect that threatens 
the component within the laptop.  If the internal temperature of the laptop rises above a critical threshold, then certain 
components, such as the RAM or hard drives, may fail as a result.  To prevent this, CPUs and GPUs in most modern laptops will 
down-clock themselves, i.e. operate at a lower speed and produce less heat, for a period of time when the overall internal 
temperature is too high.  On the other end of the SoS spectrum, throttling is specifically implemented as part of the Transfer 
Control Protocol (TCP) protocols that forms part of the operational backbone of the Internet itself.  Specifically, TCP contains 
rules for end-to-end flow control that prevents individual senders from sending too much data to receivers and overstressing them 
to the point where they cannot respond to everything in a timely manner.  Sending more data to a receiver is precisely the 
perturbation behind the infamous Distributed Denial Of Service (DDoS) attacks are the leading cause of Internet websites to fail, 
due to exogenous “hacking”.  In a DDoS, multiple senders are used (often because they are compromised via a malevolent 
computer program) to send data to a single receiver, overflowing the receivers queues with bogus requests and reducing its ability 
to effectively service legitimate clients. 
 
In the language of Richards[21], intensity regulation is a failure reduction strategy to ensure survivability that applies to systems 
and systems of systems. 
D. Cause-Effect Mapping to determine survivability strategies for the MarSoS 
To develop a list of perturbations of interest, and to determine possible points of intervention where viability strategies can be 
applied, a cause-effect mapping is performed where the multiple causes and effects of perturbations are linked from spontaneous 
events to terminal conditions.  Spontaneous events are those outside the system’s control.  In many cases, spontaneous events are 
exogenous (i.e. outside the system boundary), such as changes in the weather or the action of an outside entity.  Spontaneous events 
can also be endogenous, such as a random component failure or operator error.   Spontaneity is not absolute, but rather it is relative 
to the system.   
A cause-effect mapping begins with a terminal event (Fgure 13).  The causes of that event are added to the map as perturbations 
of interest and a single arrow from each of the causes to terminal event is drawn.  If any of the causes of the terminal event are not 
spontaneous events, then their causes, along with appropriate arrows, are added to the map as additional perturbations of interest.  
Then each perturbation of interest is examined for additional causes and effects.  Arrows are drawn to any causes and effects 
already on the map and new perturbations are added, as necessary.  This process continues until each perturbation originally 
started with a spontaneous event, and eventually results in a terminal event.  If a perturbation cannot eventually lead to a terminal 
event, then it is not worth considering and should be removed from the cause-effect mapping.    
 
 
Figure 12 Simple Cause Effect Mapping 
The cause-effect mapping is useful for being able to highlight areas of intervention, where strategies can be implemented to 
increase viability by mitigating or recovering from causes by preventing their effects from happening.  For example, in Figure 14, 
operators tend to perform more errors when they are under a high workload (Wiener & Nagel, 1988).   This perturbation can lead 
to a terminal event (e.g. interception rate failure), so reducing the probability of operators being overworked is one strategy for 
increasing the viability of the system overall.  This can be achieved, for example, by incorporating automation into the 
identification process that double checks operator’s actions for common mistakes.   
 
 
 
Figure 13:  Applying a survivability strategy as an intervention 
A cause-effect mapping was performed for the MarSoS (Figure 15).  Not all perturbations are shown in the figure, rather only a 
very small subset is shown to highlight where new strategies for enhancing viability might be made.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 14 Cause-Effect Mapping for the MarSoS 
 
The causal diagram highlights several interesting dynamics associated with how perturbations in this particular system propagate.  
System architects are constrained in how they can intervene to solve some of the problems caused by the perturbations. There is a 
limited amount of time, money and other resources to implement solutions to every perturbation.  There are also design 
constraints, such as size and weight, as well as boundary constraints that limit the influence system architects have.  For these 
reasons, system architects must be selective in the strategies they chose to implement.   A cause-effect mapping enables system 
architects to visually identify possible points of intervention where the system or supporting enterprise can do something to avoid, 
mitigate and recover from certain types of perturbations.  In particular, system architects should try to intervene to avoid 
perturbations that have multiple effects, known as common causes, and survive perturbations that have multiple causes, known as 
common effects.   It is particularly important to intervene against perturbations that are part of a reinforcing loop, since they are 
both the sources of multiple effects and multiple causes simultaneously, and lead to the often devastating cascading failures seen 
in large-scale systems of systems.  Cause-effect mappings also help system architects deal with “unknown unknowns”, or 
perturbations that no one thought of.  Sometimes the solution to a known problem is also the solution to unknown problem.  
Common causes and common effects are probably more likely to be causes and effects of unknown perturbations as well. 
 
By using the cause-effect mapping to generate perturbations of interest, recognizing the differences between system and global 
contexts, and looking at some related historical cases, some interesting strategies for enabling survivability emerge.  These, along 
with the points of intervention, are shown in  
Figure 15. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 Cause-Effect Mapping for the MarSoS with Survivability Strategies applied 
E. Illustrations from MarSoS 
Using historical case studies, such as the Northeast Blackout of 2003, cause-effect mapping, and experimenting with the MarSoS 
DES, some strategies for avoiding and/or surviving perturbations, particularly in systems of systems, were discovered.  These 
strategies are summarized in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 Perturbations, Strategies and Examples for Survivability for the MarSoS 
PERTURBATIONS STRATEGY STRATEGY DESCRIPTION HISTORICAL CASE 
Cost	  
Threshold	  
Exceeded
 
UAV	  Runs	  
Out	  of	  Fuel
 
Stockpile
 
Store	  excess	  consumable	  resources	  to	  prevent	  disruptions	  of	  supply.	   Strategic	   Petroleum	  Reserve	   (SPR)	   by	   the	  United	  States.	  
Rocket	  
Attack
 
Deflection
 
Divert	  perturbations	   away	   from	   the	   system.	  Deflection	   is	  diversion	  of	   	   exogenous	  perturbations	  away	   from	  critical	  components.	   Chaff	  used	  during	  WWII	  to	   deceive	   radar	  systems.	  
Stakeholder	  
Withdrawal
 
Commitment
 
Ensure	  that	  critical	  entities	  do	  not	  withdraw	  their	  support	  to	  the	  system.	   Service	   Level	  Agreement	   (SLA)	   such	  as	  Google	  API	  SLA.	  
Violation	  of	  
Assignment	  
Rules
 
Authenticaion
 
Verify	   entities	   before	   allowing	   them	   within	   system	  boundary.	  
Username	   and	  password	   on	   major	  commercial	   websites,	  ID	   badges	   at	   nuclear	  power	  plants	  
Strategy	  Of	  
Least	  
Privilege
 
Components	   should	   only	   be	   limited	   in	   their	   influence	   of	  other	  components	  to	  only	  what	  is	  necessary.	  
User	   account	   privileges	  on	   computer	   networks	  such	   as	   the	   Sony	  PlayStation	   Network	  (PSN).	  
PERTURBATIONS STRATEGY STRATEGY DESCRIPTION HISTORICAL CASE 
UAV	  Not	  In	  
Range
 
Vigilance
 
Monitor	  for	  both	  internal	  and	  external	  changes.	   Multiple	   security	  checkpoints	   at	   an	  airport.	  
Operator	  
Overworked
 
Redirection
 
Divert	   perturbations	   away	   from	   critical	   components.	  	  Redirection	   is	   diversion	   of	   endogenous	   perturbations	  away	  from	  critical	  components.	   Transfer	   Control	  Protocol	   (TCP)	   used	   in	  the	  Internet.	  
Large	  Increase	  in	  
Target	  Arrivals
 
Throttling
 
Reduce	   intensity	   of	   outputs	   to	   prevent	   perturbations	   to	  nearby	  contexts.	   CPU	   downclocking	   to	  avoid	   excessive	   heat	  spreading	   to	   nearby	  components.	  
 
To choose one example, the strategy of vigilance can be demonstrated by the MarSoS DES.  In the terrorist scenario, the terrorist 
ship appears as a fisherman when enters the AOI, typically passing through the normal detection/identification phase as any other 
civilian ship would.  When the terrorist is close to the port, he/she speeds up and ignores coastal regulations on its way to detonate 
a bomb in the port.  If the MarSoS is not vigilant, then by the time it notices the infraction and sends a patrol boat to intercept, the 
terrorist has already reached the port and detonated the bomb (a terminal event).  However, the strategy of vigilance can be 
applied where friendly vehicles heading to port are tracked by patrol boats after they have been identified. 
Performing a 2x2 design of experiments, where the vigilance strategy is applied against the control group, and looking at both a 
light traffic (λ = 11.25 ships / h) and heavy traffic (λ = 22.5 ships / h) context, the following two contingency tables were 
generated after running each treatment 10,000 times. 
 
Graphing the results shows a strong difference in both contexts when the vigilance strategy is applied (see Figure 16). Using a 
Fisher exact t-test, there is a significant difference between the vigilant strategy and the control in both the light traffic and heavy 
traffic contexts (p < 0.0001).   
 
 
Figure 16 Comparison of Vigilance to no Vigilance Strategy for the MarSoS 
The strategy of vigilance for the MarSoS is an example of a survivability strategy that has no meaning with the context of a 
traditional system. It is a viable strategy because the MarSoS has loosely coupled elements, geographic diversity and local 
contexts. These both allow the possibility of intrusion by outside elements and suggest a strategy (vigilance) as a means to deal 
with such hostile (and rare) outside elements.  
 
As another example, the strategy of commitment is one that only makes sense because the SoS allows the possibility of coupling 
through influence (which can be withdrawn). For traditional systems, which are strongly coupled (e.g. a satellite), the concept of 
commitment would have no meaning. 
 
VI. DISCUSSION 
This paper has demonstrated that for one kind of system of systems (the directed SoS), the meta-property of survivability may not 
be understood the same way as for a system.  We have demonstrated that some strategies for survivability may be the same 
(between a system and a system of systems), some may be implemented at the system level or system of system level with 
different levels of effectiveness (e.g. margin) and some have no meaning for systems (e.g. vigilance or commitment). In one 
sense, the loose coupling of system of systems opens up new degrees of freedom and abstract design spaces for survivability 
strategies relative to (traditional) systems. 
 
So far, the paper has only demonstrated the existence of these differences for one of the “ilities” and for one kind of SoS. There 
has been considerable work done on some of the other “ilities” such as flexibility and adaptability[2]. We hypothesize that 
strategies for implementation of some of these “ilities” will show the same richness for Systems of Systems relative to Systems 
i.e. that they may be modalities available for flexibility in a SoS that do not exist for a system. The same may be true for 
evolvability, extensibility etc. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, the question of whether Systems of Systems could be treated as (traditional) systems or were a new class of systems 
was examined. It was shown that SoSs as conventionally defined had properties not found in traditional systems. For example, the 
possibility that elements of an SoS could belong to more than one SoS at the same time. This calls into question the idea of a 
sharp system boundary. Another difference is found in the idea of influences. Some types of SoS allow for economic, social or 
regulatory influences between the component elements. The traditional definition of systems would not include this kind of 
coupling.  However, these differences have been previously explored.  
 
In this paper, an additional question was explored. This was whether the “illities” which meta-properties associated with systems 
were the same or different for systems of systems. By examining historical examples and by using a maritime security SoS as a 
testbed, this paper showed that the “illity” called survivability had some strategies that directly mapped from systems and also 
allowed new strategies that only made sense for a SoS (e, g reversion to an intermediate stable form and vigilance).  
 
This shows that new strategies for “illities” exist in one “illity”. However there are numerous of these “beyond first use 
properties” known to exist for complex systems. We thus hypothesize for some of the other “illities” (flexibility, adaptability et 
cetera) that that there might be expanded strategies associated with them being applied to SoSs. This opens up a rich new area of 
research for “beyond first use properties”. 
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